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Appl Cognit Psychol. 2019;1–11.Summary
The intelligence community uses “structured analytic techniques” to help analysts
think critically and avoid cognitive bias. However, little evidence exists of how tech-
niques are applied and whether they are effective. We examined the use of the anal-
ysis of competing hypotheses (ACH)—a technique designed to reduce “confirmation
bias.” Fifty intelligence analysts were randomly assigned to use ACH or not when
completing a hypothesis testing task that had probabilistic ground truth. Data on ana-
lysts' judgement processes and conclusions were collected using written protocols
that were then coded for statistical analyses. We found that ACH‐trained analysts
did not follow all of the steps of ACH. There was mixed evidence for ACH's ability
to reduce confirmation bias, and we observed that ACH may increase judgement
inconsistency and error. It may be prudent for the intelligence community to consider
the conditions under which ACH would prove useful and to explore alternatives.
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Intelligence analysts are required to assess evidence to test alterna-
tive accounts of a current or future situation. In performing such a
cognitively complex task, analysts may resort to using simple strate-
gies that can bias their thinking and result in judgement errors
(Belton & Dhami, in press). In particular, it is argued that analysts
may suffer from “confirmation bias” (Heuer, 1999). This can manifest
itself in a number of ways (see Klayman, 1995; Nickerson, 1998).
Analysts are often portrayed as not considering alternative hypothe-
ses; searching for evidence supporting rather than disconfirming
their prior beliefs; reaching conclusions about a hypothesis based
on the presence of supporting rather than conflicting evidence; and
insufficiently adjusting their belief in a hypothesis when existing
(supporting) evidence is discredited (e.g., Cook & Smallman, 2008;
Lehner, Adelman, Cheikes, & Brown, 2008; Lehner et al., 2009).
Indeed, confirmation bias is a popular explanation for intelligence- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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he Queen in Right of Canada Repfailures such as the Iraq weapons of mass destruction mis‐estimate
(Jervis, 2006).
In an effort to assist analysts to think critically and avoid bias, the
intelligence community has adopted the use of “structured analytic tech-
niques.” The analysis of competing hypotheses (ACH; Heuer, 1999,
2005) is one such technique. It is designed to help analysts avoid “confir-
mation bias” in several respects, namely, by explicitly requiring them to (a)
consider alternative hypotheses; (b) rate evidence as inconsistent (or
consistent) with each hypothesis under consideration; (c) adjust their
belief in a hypothesis in accordance with evidence diagnosticity (or cred-
ibility); (d) select the most likely hypothesis based solely on (it being the
one with the least) inconsistent evidence; and (e) identify indicators that
will disconfirm (or confirm) a hypothesis in the future.
Critics of ACH have noted several shortcomings (e.g., Chang, Berdini,
Mandel, & Tetlock, 2018; Jones, 2017; Mandel, in press; Murukannaiah,
Kalia, Telang, & Singh, 2015). It is vague inmultiple respects. For instance,
it is unclear how hypotheses should be selected; what criteria should be- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
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2 DHAMI ET AL.used to rate evidence as being consistent or inconsistent with a hypoth-
esis; or what criteria should be used to judge evidence diagnosticity. This
vagueness permits the analyst's judgement process to become unreliable.
Finally, ACH does not represent some features of relevant normative
methods, such as Bayesianism, for revising beliefs in the face of uncertain
evidence. For instance, it provides no guidance on how prior beliefs
should be revised in light of new evidence, and so itmay be prone to base
rate neglect (Bar‐Hillel, 1980). ACH's information integration rule
involves merely counting the number of weighted inconsistent evidence
items for any given hypothesis, while discounting the amount of
supporting evidence. Consequently, ACH will diverge from the predic-
tions of Bayes theorem under some conditions, such as when the prior
probability distribution over the set of hypotheses is far from uniform
(as in the experiment reported here).
Despite these limitations, the intelligence community continues to
hold the belief that ACH encourages critical thinking and cognitively
debiases analysts (e.g., Marrin, 2008). Indeed, ACH is one of the few
techniques listed in the U.S. Government's (2009) Tradecraft Primer.
ACH also features prominently in the UK Ministry of Defence's (2013)
Quick Wins for Busy Analysts handbook. The popularity of ACH is sur-
prising given the dearth of empirical research testing its utility (Chang
et al., 2018; Dhami, Mandel, Mellers, & Tetlock, 2015; Pool, 2010).2 | PAST RESEARCH ON THE ANALYSES OF
COMPETING HYPOTHESES
The small body of past research is conceptually vague in terms of the
features of ACH being tested, although there is a general focus on
measuring some aspects of confirmation bias (Convertino, Billman,
Pirolli, Massar, & Shrager, 2008; Kretz & Granderson, 2013; Kretz,
Simpson, & Graham, 2012; Lehner et al., 2008). Specifically, the stud-
ies induce confirmation bias in participants before testing ACH by pre-
senting evidence in stages such that it initially favours one hypothesis,
and then in later stages, it either balances out across the hypotheses
(Convertino et al., 2008), supports a hypothesis it initially conflicted
with (Lehner et al., 2008), or conflicts with the hypothesis it initially
supported (Kretz et al., 2012; Kretz & Granderson, 2013). Thus,
researchers cannot comment on how ACH may reduce other aspects
of confirmation bias such as explicitly requiring them to consider alter-
native hypotheses, rate evidence as inconsistent (or consistent) with
each hypothesis under consideration, adjust belief in a hypothesis in
accordance with evidence diagnosticity (or credibility), and identify
indicators that will disconfirm (or confirm) a hypothesis in the future.
Lehner et al. (2008) reported that ACH reduced confirmation bias
(measured in terms of the size of the significant positive correlations
between participants' confidence in an initial hypothesis and their rat-
ings of the extent to which subsequent evidence supported that
hypothesis) in participants with no analytic experience but not in
those with experience. This was partly because the latter group ini-
tially demonstrated less bias. ACH, however, did not appear to reduce
participants' resistance to change from one hypothesis to another.
Convertino et al. (2008) found that confirmation bias (measured interms of belief in the initially supported hypothesis in later phases
and the importance attached to evidence supporting the favoured
hypothesis) was evident across all groups studied, but stronger in
the group with similar beliefs rather than dissimilar beliefs. Kretz
et al. (2012) and Kretz and Granderson (2013) found that participants
using ACH did not consistently outperform those using one of two
other techniques (i.e., link analysis and information extraction and
weighting) in terms of the number of hypotheses generated and how
often the chosen hypothesis was supported by the evidence overall.
The aforementioned studies have several shortcomings. They were
based on very small samples, precluding statistical testing of the reli-
ability and size of any effects reported. Lehner et al. (2008) studied
24 individuals. Convertino et al.'s (2008) study involved nine, three‐
member, geographically distributed groups of students. Kretz et al.
(2012) and Kretz and Granderson (2013) studied 27 junior engineers
without analytic experience. In addition, some past studies did not
include relevant control groups against which ACH could be com-
pared. In Convertino et al.'s (2008) study, all groups used a collabora-
tive version of ACH. Kretz et al. (2012) and Kretz and Granderson
(2013) compared ACH with two techniques whose primary function
is not hypothesis testing (see Dhami, Belton, & Careless, 2016). Fur-
thermore, some of the studies using a control group were confounded
by the fact that some “control” participants were familiar with ACH
and may have used it (Kretz et al., 2012; Kretz & Granderson, 2013;
Lehner et al., 2008). Finally, none of the studies measured whether
analysts in the ACH group applied ACH correctly.3 | THE PRESENT RESEARCH
We examine all of the features of ACH using a comparatively larger
sample of practicing intelligence analysts, half of whom were randomly
assigned to be trained to use ACH and half of whom were not. The
experiment had three main aims. First, we sought to compare the
judgement processes of analysts trained (and instructed) to use ACH
against analysts from the same cohort not trained in ACH and not
instructed to use any particular technique (i.e., control group). Accord-
ing to proponents of ACH, the untrained group ought to demonstrate
greater “confirmation bias” than the ACH group in several respects. In
the context of our experiment, this bias is conceptualized as: (a) not
considering all alternative hypotheses; (b) only evaluating evidence
based on whether it is consistent with each hypothesis under consid-
eration; (c) not adjusting belief in a hypothesis in accordance with evi-
dence diagnosticity; (d) selecting the most likely hypothesis based
solely on evidence that is consistent with it; and (e) identifying indica-
tors that will only confirm a hypothesis in the future.
The second aimwas to measure the extent of within‐individual con-
sistency in the judgement processes of theACHand untrained groups. It
is reasonable to expect that analysts taught to use ACH may demon-
strate greater consistency in how they approach a hypothesis testing
task compared with those who have not been taught to use ACH.
The final aim was to compare the accuracy of the ACH and
untrained groups. Although ACH was designed to reduce judgement
DHAMI ET AL. 3bias and error, as Dhami et al. (2016) point out, techniques such as
ACH cannot guarantee accuracy. This is partly because they rely on
the judgement skills of the analyst and his/her subjective input of
the information and interpretation of the outputs. Past research on
ACH does not sufficiently comment on its ability to help analysts
arrive at the correct solution; however, the implicit belief among the
intelligence community is that ACH can improve the accuracy of those
analysts who use it as opposed to those who do not.4 | METHOD
The present study received ethics approval from the Middlesex Uni-
versity Department of Psychology Research Ethics Committee.
4.1 | Participants
Analysts undergoing their regular training at a UK intelligence organi-
zation were asked by the trainers to participate in the experiment. In
total, 50 analysts participated, and there was no attrition.1 Fifty‐seven
per cent of the sample was male. The mean age of the sample was
27.79 years (SD = 5.03). The mean number of months' experience
working as an analyst was 14.08 (SD = 29.50). Half of the sample
was randomly allocated to the experimental group and half to the con-
trol group. The two groups did not differ significantly on any of the
aforementioned demographic variables.
4.2 | Analytic task and measures
ACH training was based on the latest version of ACH (see Heuer &
Pherson, 2014; Pherson Associates, LLC, n.d.; seeTable A1). The train-
ing was delivered by the organization's trainers during a half‐day ses-
sion, and analysts were “assessed” using in‐class exercises. (The
control group was given ACH training after the experiment)
Analysts each performed an analytic task (i.e., judging the likeli-
hood that a target individual belongs to one tribe) comprising four
hypotheses (i.e., tribes) and 12 evidence items (e.g., language spoken).
The probability of occurrence of each evidence item (i.e., the diagnos-
tic probability) was provided, as was the base rate information for
each hypothesis (see Table A2 for task properties). The task enabled
analysts to apply all of the steps of ACH and arrive at a normatively
correct conclusion by relying solely on the available information. A sta-
tistical analysis using Bayes theorem under the assumption of cue
independence (i.e., a naïve Bayes model of the evidence) shows that
the most probable hypothesis is that the target is a member of the
Conda tribe (46% chance). The probabilities for the other tribes are
Dengo (31%), Bango (15%), and Acanda (8%). (Although we acknowl-
edge that the task does not demand the simplifying assumption of
cue independence, we found no evidence—such as discussion of
inter‐cue relationships—to suggest the invalidity of the assumption.)
Analysts were instructed as follows: “In this task, you will be asked
to assess the tribe membership of a randomly selected person from a1Further data collection was not possible because the organization changed its training
regime.region. The region and groups are fictitious and bear no intended rela-
tionship to any real groups in any region on Earth. Your task is to use
the information provided to offer the best assessment you can of the
target person's tribe membership. After reading the scenario, you will
be asked to detail your analysis. Then, you will be asked to assess the
likelihood of specific hypotheses and the usefulness of the various
pieces of information that you received.”
The scenario was as follows: “In the Zuma region of Zanda, there are
four tribes called Acanda, Bango, Conda, and Dengo. They represent 5%,
20%, 30%, and 45% of Zuma's population, respectively. Assume that
Acanda and Conda are hostile tribes, whereas Bango and Dengo are
friendly. Your governmentwould like to improve its understanding of this
region and has captured a randomly chosen inhabitant to be interviewed.
The inhabitant was given a truth serum and will have provided accurate
information. In this sense, your task is already easier than in real life since
you don't have to worry about inaccuracies in the information provided.
Moreover, you may assume that this target, when released, will have no
memory of the capture and his brief absence will not have been noticed
by any Zumans. Finally, the sex of the target (male) is non‐diagnostic
since all tribes have the same ratio of males to females (1:1).”
Participants were then told “Assume that your government has
already determined the following information which is at your dis-
posal.” See Table A2 for a summary description of the four tribes in
terms of the 12 evidence items, and the information about the target.
Data were collected using a written protocol. The ACH group was
told “In order to solve the analytic task presented, we would like you
to use the technique called ‘Analysis of Competing Hypotheses’
(ACH). This consists of the steps described below. Please use the
space provided to detail your analysis using ACH” (see Table A3).
The control group was told “Report your conclusions in the box below.
Consider the relative likelihood of all of the hypotheses. State which
items of information were the most diagnostic, and how compelling
a case they make in identifying the most likely hypothesis. Also say
why alternative hypotheses were rejected. (You can use the page
overleaf to make any notes you need.)”2
Participation took either a morning or afternoon of a scheduled
training day. All data collection occurred at the intelligence organiza-
tion in small groups in training rooms. All tasks were completed using
pen and paper. Participants were debriefed at the end.
4.3 | Data coding
The data in the written protocols were coded using a structured cod-
ing scheme (a copy is available from the first author). This scheme was
divided into three parts. The first enabled coding of variables
pertaining to data that could potentially be available for both groups
(e.g., selection of tribe membership of the target individual and
whether the analyst took account of base rate information). The sec-
ond part contained codes for variables pertaining to data we would
expect to observe for the ACH group only given the contents of their
training (e.g., did they draw a ACH matrix?). The final part enabled2After completing the above task, all analysts were asked to each complete a posttask ques-
tionnaire, and the results of which are reported in Mandel et al. (2018).
TABLE 1 Frequencies for ACH and untrained (control) groups on
main variables of interest
Measure
ACH Control
Yes No Yes No
Identified all hypotheses 23 2 25 0
Identified all relevant evidence 23 2 17 8
Reformatted data 25 0 20 5
Used scoring rule to assess evidence 25 0 20 5
Used base rates 3 22 13 12
Considered evidence diagnosticity 20 5 8 17
Evidence integration*
Only inconsistent evidence 5 — 0 —
Only consistent evidence 1 — 4 —
Both consistent and inconsistent evidence 19 — 16 —
Conducted sensitivity analysis 15 10 1 24
Consistent in applying evidence scoring rule 1 24 4 5
Consistent in evidence integration 19 6 12 3
Consistent in final conclusion* 16 9 16 0
Correctly ranked hypotheses* 1 24 2 14
Correctly chose most likely hypothesis* 9 16 8 16
Note. *See footnotes in Section 5 for why n < 25 in either group.
4 DHAMI ET AL.coding of data that could be available for the untrained group only
(e.g., did they reformat the data? If so, how?).5 | RESULTS
The coded data are presented inTable 1. In order to examine the associ-
ation between group (ACH or untrained/control) and performance on
specific aspects of the analytic task,we analysed the data using chi‐square
tests of independence supplemented with effect size measures. The
results are presented below in order of the three main aims of the study.3Six correctly transformed the negative values first, one did not, and it was difficult to deter-
mine what the last one did.
4Shannon entropy is a well known, general purpose measure of information in a communica-
tion (or for present purposes, a measure of the diagnosticity of an evidence item).5.1 | Analysts' judgement processes
Our first set of analyses measured the association between judgement
process and group (ACH vs. untrained). Several aspects of the judgement
process were examined, following the steps of ACH (seeTable A1).
5.1.1 | Task understanding
ACH requires analysts to identify all possible, mutually exclusive
hypotheses and evidence items relevant for testing these. Most of
the analysts in the ACH group (i.e., 92%; n = 23) and all (n = 25) of
the untrained group identified the four specific hypotheses in the sce-
nario, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 2.08, p = .149, ϕ = −.20.
A statistically significantly greater proportion of the ACH group
(i.e., 92%, n = 23) compared with the untrained group (i.e., 68%,
n = 17) identified all 12 evidence items relevant for testing thealternative hypotheses, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 4.50, p = .034, ϕ = .30. There
were no observable order effects in the evidence items that were
ignored by analysts in each group.
5.1.2 | Task representation
ACH requires analysts to represent the task in terms of a matrix with
hypotheses as columns and evidence as rows, and all of the ACH
group did this. Eighty per cent (n = 20) of the untrained group also
reformatted the data. The difference between groups was statistically
significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 5.56, p = .018, ϕ = .33. A closer examina-
tion of data from the 20 analysts in the untrained group who
reformatted the task revealed that 16 drew a matrix (i.e., 14 with
hypotheses as columns and evidence as rows, and two with evidence
as columns and hypotheses as rows) and four made a list.
5.1.3 | Evidence assessment
All of the ACH group applied the scoring rule for assessing evidence in
relation to each hypothesis, as instructed. Eighty per cent (n = 20) of
the untrained group used some form of scoring rule. The difference
between groups was statistically significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 5.56,
p = .018, ϕ = .33. Of those 20 analysts in the untrained group who
used a scoring rule, eight added up the evidence likelihood percent-
ages for each hypothesis3 or performed a similar calculation, whereas
12 attached points for matching evidence in different ways (four of
these divided the scale in half so that >50% = 1 point, six divided
the scale into several intervals so that ≥75 = 3 points, ≥50% = 2
points, and ≥25% = 1 point, and the remaining two gave a point to
the hypothesis that was the best match for each evidence item in
terms of having the highest likelihood for that item).
5.1.4 | Evidence diagnosticity
In order to evaluate how well analysts assessed evidence diagnosticity,
we examined the ACH group and untrained group separately. Only 11
analysts produced, as instructed, an amended ACH matrix (see Step 4
of the ACH process in Table A1) with evidence items reordered from
the original (Step 3) matrix based on their diagnosticity. A further nine
analysts removed one or more items but did not reorder their matrix.
For each of these 20 analysts, we compared the rankings of the evidence
items with the ranking computed using “information gain,” an information
utility measure that gauges reduction in Shannon entropy (see Nelson,
2005).4 Mean Kendal's tau b was .63 (SD = 0.16). The tau b correlations
were statistically significant for eight analysts (p < .05), indicating a degree
of accuracy in these analysts' assessments of evidence diagnosticity.
Individual analysts in the untrained group did not list enough evi-
dence items as diagnostic to compute individual correlations between
their rankings and an objective measure. Therefore, the correlational
6Here, n = 9 because we can only make this calculation for analysts who used a scoring rule
(n = 12). Of those, there were three analysts whose consistency could not be determined.
7Here, n = 15 because the calculation included the nine analysts who used a scoring rule and
DHAMI ET AL. 5analysis was computed across the whole group by comparing the per-
centage of analysts that identified the evidence items as diagnostic
with the items' ranking using the Shannon entropy reduction measure.
Kendal's tau b was .44, p = .07.
5.1.5 | Taking account of diagnosticity and base
rates
ACH does not provide any guidance on the use of base rates, and a
statistically significantly smaller proportion (i.e., 12%, n = 3) of analysts
in the ACH group used base rate information compared with 52%
(n = 13) of the untrained group, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 9.19, p = .002,
ϕ = −.43.
Eighty per cent (n = 20) of the ACH group took some account of
evidence diagnosticity, as instructed (i.e., by deleting some evidence
items in their revised matrix and/or reordering their matrix based on
diagnosticity). Thirty‐two per cent (n = 8) of the untrained group
ranked evidence items in some way based on diagnosticity or stated
that they took account of diagnosticity in reaching their conclusion.
The difference between groups was statistically significant, χ2
(1, N = 50) = 11.69, p = .001, ϕ = .48.
5.1.6 | Evidence integration
When selecting the most likely hypothesis, ACH requires analysts to
add up only evidence inconsistent with each hypothesis, ignoring evi-
dence consistent with it, and to consider the hypothesis with the low-
est number of inconsistent ratings as most likely. We found a
statistically significant difference between the two groups in how they
selected the most likely hypothesis, χ2 (2, N = 50) = 6.58, p = .037,
V = .38. Post hoc analyses were conducted to further explore the
source of this difference. We found that despite their training, only
20% (n = 5) of analysts in the ACH group relied solely on inconsistent
evidence, and none of the untrained group5 did so. This difference
between groups was statistically significant, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 5.14,
p = .023, ϕ = .33. A small minority of analysts in both groups added
up only evidence consistent with each hypothesis (i.e., ACH: 4%,
n = 1 and untrained: 22%, 4 out of n = 20), χ2 (1, N = 50) = 2.88,
p = .090, ϕ = −.25. Finally, the majority of analysts in both groups
added up both consistent and inconsistent evidence (i.e., ACH: 76%,
n = 19 and untrained: 78%, 16 out of n = 20), χ2 (1, N = 50) = 0.01,
p = .954, ϕ = −.01.
5.1.7 | Sensitivity analysis and indicators for future
observation
Finally, ACH requires analysts to assess the sensitivity of their conclu-
sions and identify indicators for future observation that would support
or contest their conclusion. A statistically significantly greater propor-
tion of analysts in the ACH group (i.e., 60%, n = 15) checked the sen-
sitivity of their conclusions to a change in assumptions compared with5Here, n = 20 because we can only make this calculation for analysts who made a matrix or a
list of evidence.4% (n = 1) of the untrained group, χ2 (1, N = 50) = 18.02, p < .001,
ϕ = .60.
Seventy‐two per cent (n = 18) of analysts in the ACH group pro-
vided at least one indicator. A total of 68 indicators were provided
by these analysts, with 22 indicators potentially confirming their con-
clusion, 19 disconfirming it, and 27 being neutral (i.e., that could either
confirm or disconfirm their conclusion depending on the circum-
stances). A Friedman test found no statistically significant difference
in the type of indicators provided by those 18 analysts in the ACH
group who provided indicators, χ2 (2, N = 18) = .13, p = .936, Kendall's
W = .004.5.2 | Within‐individual consistency in judgement
processes
Our next set of analyses measured the association between measures
of within‐individual consistency in judgement processes and group
(ACH vs. untrained). The consistency variable was defined in three dif-
ferent ways.5.2.1 | Consistency of evidence assessment
A statistically significantly smaller proportion of analysts in the ACH
group (i.e., 4%, n = 1) applied their scoring rule consistently across evi-
dence items compared with 44% (4 out of n = 96) of the untrained
group who used a scoring rule, χ2 (1, N = 34) = 8.63, p = .003, ϕ = −.50.5.2.2 | Consistency of evidence integration
Seventy‐six per cent (n = 19) of the ACH group applied their evidence
integration strategy consistently across hypotheses compared with
80% (12 out of n = 157) of the untrained group who used an evidence
integration strategy, χ2 (1, N = 40) = 0.09, p = .769, ϕ = −.05.5.2.3 | Consistency of judgements
The final conclusion reached by 64% (n = 16) of the ACH group
matched the judgements made in their revised matrix (preceding
judgements). By contrast, where it was possible to evaluate, the final
conclusion presented by all of the analysts in the untrained group
(out of n = 168) was consistent with their preceding judgement pro-
cess. This difference between groups was statistically significant, χ2
(1, N = 41) = 7.38, p = .007, ϕ = −.42.added up their scores plus the six analysts that added up the likelihood percentages for each
hypothesis.
8This refers to the 16 analysts who used a scoring rule of some kind.
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Our final set of analyses measured the association between accuracy
and group (ACH vs. untrained). Analysts' accuracy (i.e., the most likely
tribe membership of the target individual) was evaluated in two differ-
ent ways.
One way of measuring accuracy was on an ordinal scale (i.e., cor-
rectness of analysts' ranking of tribe membership from most to least
likely). Here, only one (4%) of the 25 analysts in the ACH group pro-
duced a correct rank ordering of the four hypotheses compared with
two (4.9%) of 169 analysts in the untrained group. This difference
between groups was not statistically significant, χ2 (1, N = 41) = .31,
p = .308, ϕ = −.16. A further examination of the data revealed that a
statistically significantly greater proportion (i.e., 80%, n = 20 of 25)
of analysts in the ACH group had one or more tied ranks between
hypotheses compared with 19% (n = 3 of 16) of the untrained group,
χ2 (1, N = 41) = 14.86, p < .001, ϕ = .60.
The other way of measuring accuracy was on a categorical/binary
scale (i.e., whether analysts chose the correct tribe as the most likely).
Thirty‐six per cent (n = 9) of analysts in the ACH group and 33% (n = 8)
in the untrained group10 chose the correct hypothesis (i.e., Conda
tribe), and this difference between groups was not statistically signifi-
cant, χ2 (1, N = 49) = .04, p = .845, ϕ = .03.
Finally, we also explored the relationship between within‐
individual consistency and accuracy across both groups. A McNemar
test revealed that a statistically significantly greater proportion of ana-
lysts in both groups (i.e., 80%, n = 4 out of 5) who applied their evi-
dence assessment rule consistently across evidence items were
accurate in their choice of most likely tribe, compared with 31%
(n = 9 out of 29) of analysts who were inconsistent, p = .021, odds
ratio = 8.89. Similarly, a statistically significantly greater proportion
of analysts in both groups who applied their evidence integration rule
consistently across hypotheses (i.e., 38.7%, n = 12 out of 31) chose the
correct tribe, compared with 22.2% (n = 2 out of 9) of those who were
inconsistent, p < .001, odds ratio = 2.21.6 | DISCUSSION
The intelligence community believes that ACH helps analysts to think
critically and avoid “confirmation bias.” The present study examined
ACH in practice. We found that most analysts trained (and instructed)
to use ACH deviated from one or more of the steps prescribed by this
technique. In particular, they departed from ACH's Step 5, which
refers to evidence integration (see Table A1). Past research on ACH
has not measured the extent to which participants fully applied
ACH. However, Trent, Voshell, and Patterson (2007) reported that
army intelligence officers resisted using ACH after being trained and
repeatedly instructed to do so. In fact, intelligence organizations also
find themselves deviating from some of the steps prescribed by9Here, n = 16 because we can only perform this analysis on those who provided written con-
clusions regarding all four hypotheses.
10One analyst did not provide any conclusion.ACH. For instance, in its manual describing ACH, UK Defence Intelli-
gence (UK Ministry of Defence, 2013, p. 15) asks analysts to consider
“If this hypothesis were true, how likely would this evidence be?” Ana-
lysts must enter a score of 0 to 4, where 0 represents less than 10%, 1
represents 10–25%, 2 represents 50–75%, and 4 represents more
than 75%. Then, they must add up the scores for each hypothesis.
These are significant departures from ACH, and yet both analysts
and their organizations would believe they are applying ACH. Clearly,
future research ought to examine the efficacy of ACH as designed and
if it is found to be useful then more needs to be done to persuade ana-
lysts and intelligence organizations to use it. Meanwhile, our discus-
sion of the present findings below focuses on how ACH is used in
practice.
Before we discuss the present findings, we highlight potential con-
cerns some may raise about their external validity, given the nature of
the analytic task used in the present study. Although intelligence ana-
lysts seldom face such neat problems (i.e., where all hypotheses are
provided and are mutually exclusive, and where all relevant evidence
is available and precisely quantified), we do not believe this implies
that analysts would perform better when faced with real intelligence
problems. This is because real problems are murky, unlike the present
task—there may be not enough relevant data or there may be large
volumes of data, the credibility of data sources may vary, the data
may be formatted in different ways (e.g., structured/unstructured,
textual/visual/audio), it may be ambiguous, unreliable and sometimes
intentionally misleading, and there may be time pressure and high‐
stakes involved. We see no reason why ACH should help under these
conditions when it does not help hypothesis evaluation under the
more modest conditions of the present experimental task where the
information available to analysts could be easily subjected to the con-
sistency tests that ACH requires. We would expect that ACH would
perform better in the simple analytic task used in the present study
than in the much more complex tasks encountered by analysts in prac-
tice. Nevertheless, it would be useful to conduct future research on
ACH involving a diverse set of tasks. Indeed, this could help to identify
some of the conditions under which ACH does better or worse.6.1 | Confirmation bias, consistency, and accuracy
In the context of our experiment, confirmation bias was conceptual-
ized as follows: (a) not considering all alternative hypotheses; (b) only
evaluating evidence based on whether it is consistent with each
hypothesis under consideration; (c) not adjusting belief in a hypothesis
in accordance with evidence diagnosticity; (d) selecting the most likely
hypothesis based solely on evidence that is consistent with it; and (e)
identifying indicators that will only confirm a hypothesis in the future.
We found that analysts in the ACH group were no more likely than
their untrained counterparts to identify the four alternative hypothe-
ses in the present experiment. On the other hand, the ACH group
were more likely to rate evidence as being either inconsistent or con-
sistent with each hypothesis (as opposed to simply more or less con-
sistent) and to take account of evidence diagnosticity. Both the ACH
DHAMI ET AL. 7and untrained groups were equally likely to focus solely on consistent
evidence when selecting the most likely hypothesis, although the
majority of analysts in both groups selected the most likely hypothesis
based on an integration of consistent and inconsistent evidence.
Finally, analysts in the ACH group who provided indicators for future
observation were no more likely to provide indicators that would dis-
confirm (as opposed to confirm) the hypotheses.
Taken from the perspective of untrained analysts, these findings
reiterate that they do not all suffer from such bias, like participants in
other psychological studies on “confirmation bias” (e.g., Beattie &
Baron, 1988). Nevertheless, it seems apt that analysts may need
explicit instructions to differentiate between evidence that is consis-
tent versus inconsistent with a hypothesis and to remove
nondiagnostic information from their “working out” (Kemmelmeier,
2004), especially when it may lead to the “dilution” of judgements
based on diagnostic information (Shelton, 1999). The fact that ACH is
vague on these two issues means that it has limited value in this regard.
Taken from the perspective of analysts trained to use ACH, the
above findings highlight that not only may analysts resist applying its
evidence integration rule but also they prefer to use (like their
untrained counterparts) a cognitively more complex strategy (i.e.,
adding up both consistent and inconsistent evidence for each hypoth-
esis). The strategy used by most of the present analysts is beneficial
because there is no “loss” of relevant information and the credibility
of all available evidence (rather than just the disconfirming evidence)
can be taken into account.
Perhaps one benefit of any sort of structured analytic technique
such as ACH is that it can make the analytic process more transparent
and easier to manage and audit by increasing within‐individual incon-
sistency. However, we found that the ACH group demonstrated sig-
nificantly less consistency in terms of evidence assessment and the
match between final conclusions and preceding judgements, com-
pared with their untrained counterparts. A large proportion of analysts
in both groups also applied their evidence integration strategy incon-
sistently across hypotheses. Inconsistency in evidence assessment
may be partly explained by the fact that, although ACH asks analysts
to distinguish between evidence that is highly inconsistent or inconsis-
tent (vs. highly consistent or consistent) with a hypothesis, it does not
specify how this should be done. These results support recent warn-
ings about how structured analytic techniques, in general, can foster
inconsistency in assessments (Chang et al., 2018; Mandel & Tetlock,
2018). Decision‐support tools may be useful in this domain because
they can reduce the cognitive burden on analysts. Reducing inconsis-
tency is important because it is difficult to identify the source of error
if an analyst is behaving inconsistently. Increasing consistency is also
important because, as we found (across both groups), it was associ-
ated with the accuracy of conclusions reached.
Indeed, one could argue that the ultimate goal of analysts is to
arrive at an accurate conclusion about a current or future situation.
However, we found that only one of the ACH group correctly ranked
the four hypotheses from most to least likely and two of the untrained
group did so. Analysts in the ACH group were significantly more likely
than their untrained counterparts to produce tied ranks betweenhypotheses, partly because ACH encourages analysts to reduce prob-
abilistic (continuous) data regarding consistency or inconsistency to a
5‐point ordinal scale. Unsurprisingly, the ACH group was no more
likely than the untrained group to choose the correct hypothesis (also
see Mandel, Karvetski, & Dhami, 2018).6.2 | Other findings on how analysts test competing
hypotheses
Several other findings emerged that shed some light on how analysts
may solve a hypothesis testing task. First, the majority of untrained
analysts reformatted the data in the task. Over half of this group drew
an ACH‐style matrix with hypotheses as columns and evidence as
rows. It is unclear if this format is helpful. Psychological research sug-
gests that the way in which information is formatted can aid or hinder
information processing in a range of cognitive tasks (e.g., Garcia‐
Retamero & Dhami, 2011, 2013; Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995).
Future research ought to systematically examine the effects of ACH's
recommended matrix format on analysts' hypothesis testing compared
with alternative information formats. Cook and Smallman (2008)
found that graphical information displays reduced the attention that
naval personnel paid to confirming evidence.
Second, although ACH is unclear about how analysts should assess
evidence diagnosticity, we observed a correlation between an objec-
tive measure of information diagnosticity and judgements of
diagnosticity made by individual analysts in the ACH group as well
as across analysts in the untrained group. It would, however, be pre-
mature to suggest that people may have some “intuitive” capacity to
judge diagnosticity since a variety of strategies can be correlated with
objectives measures such as the one we used here (i.e., information
gain). Future research could more fully explore analysts' strategies
for judging information diagnosticity against other existing measures
(see Nelson, 2005).
Finally, as mentioned earlier, ACH does not take account of base
rate information, and unsurprisingly, we found that analysts in the
ACH group were significantly less likely to do so compared with their
untrained counterparts. Nevertheless, only around half of the
untrained group used base rate information. Base rate neglect is com-
mon (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982).
Base rate information is useful because it provides an indication of
the priori probability of a hypothesis being true before being pre-
sented with any evidence. In the present study, such information
was useful for arriving at the correct conclusion because of the
inequality in base rates for the four hypotheses.
Some believe that ACH may be particularly useful for collaborative
analysis, where it can provide analysts a better understanding of dif-
ferences of opinion, depersonalize issues, and guide discussion (Heuer,
2007). However, there is, as yet, little empirical evidence to support
this view. In Convertino et al.'s (2008) study, reviewed earlier, all
groups used a collaborative version of ACH, and yet “confirmation
bias” remained evident in all groups (i.e., here, evidence initially
favoured one hypothesis but then balanced out across hypotheses
8 DHAMI ET AL.later on). Clearly, more research is needed to test the benefits of ACH
when applied in a collaborative context.6.3 | Alternatives to ACH
Given the paucity of research supporting the efficacy of ACH, it may
be prudent for the intelligence community to consider alternatives.
Some have suggested that ACH may be improved by supplementing
it with other methods (e.g., Karvetski, Olson, Gantz, & Cross, 2013;
Murukannaiah et al., 2015; Wheaton & Chido, 2006). For instance,
Murukannaiah et al. (2015) added argumentation schemes, in what
they call Arg‐ACH, to elicit users' conclusions, underlying premises
and critical questions for assessing the argument. In a study of 20 stu-
dents who were trained to use tools that implemented either ACH or
Arg‐ACH, it was found that the latter group performed better in terms
of, for example, the completeness and coverage of their belief search,
the explicitness of the assumptions they made, and the repeatability of
their reasoning. However, it is unclear how this or other ACH “add
ons” would reduce confirmation bias or improve judgement accuracy.
Given that one of the rationales for developing ACH was the desire to
reduce confirmation bias, we suggest that there are more psychologi-
cally informed and better empirically tested alternatives to ACH for
reducing confirmation bias, as well as statistically based alternatives
to hypothesis testing more generally.
Several variations of the “consider‐the‐opposite” strategy have
been reported to reduce confirmation bias. For instance, Lord, Lepper,
and Preston (1984) found that instructing individuals to imagine their
response if specific evidence pointed in the opposite direction reduces
the tendency to discount conflicting evidence. In addition, presenting
individuals with conflicting evidence in advance of their search for
information reduces search for supporting evidence. Similarly, Wil-
liams and Mandel (2007) found that probability judgements were more
coherent and accurate if queries made the complement of the judged
event explicit (i.e., probability of x rather than not x).
Computer‐based tools such as serious games have been shown to
reduce confirmation bias. Morewedge et al. (2015) reported that a sin-
gle training session involving playing an interactive video game led to
debiasing effects immediately afterwards and for at least 2 months
later. The game measured player's degree of confirmation bias (e.g.,
by gathering and interpreting evidence in a manner confirming rather
than disconfirming the hypothesis being tested), provided them with
information explaining the bias along with examples, and provided
opportunities for practice and personalized feedback.
Bayesian reasoning has previously been recommended to the intel-
ligence community (e.g., Burns, 2015; Karvetski et al., 2013; Svenson
et al., 2010). Analysts can update their belief in the prior probability
of a hypothesis being true (on a 0 to 1 scale) based on incoming evi-
dence and compute a posterior probability. The prior may be an objec-
tive base rate, .5, or it may be based on subjective knowledge. The
updating is done using Bayes' rule, which states that the posterior is
the product of a prior and a likelihood (i.e., the probability of some evi-
dence being observed if the hypothesis is true). When appliediteratively (or when updated), the posterior becomes the new prior.
Bayesian reasoning enables analysts to take account of all of the avail-
able evidence as it emerges in a precise way and avoid base rate neglect
(Mandel, 2015; see also Sedlmeier & Gigerenzer, 2001). However,
Bayesian reasoning can be complex and may require decision support.
Regardless of the alternatives to ACH that may be pursued, the
present study shows the importance of developing and using an
evidence‐base to inform decisions about the best analytic practice.
An evidence‐based approach not only enhances the performance of
individual analysts and consequently the organizations in which they
work but also supports more effective decision making to tackle secu-
rity threats.
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TABLE A3 Response sheet used for ACH group
Step 1 Identify all possible hypotheses. These should be mutually exclusive.
Step 2 Make a list of significant information/evidence that is relevant for evaluating the hypotheses, including assumptions and the absence of
things one might expect if the hypothesis were true.
Step 3 Create a matrix with all the hypotheses across the top and all items of relevant information down the left side. Then, analyse each piece
of information by asking if it is Consistent or Inconsistent with the hypothesis or if it is Not Applicable or irrelevant. This can be done
by filling each cell of the matrix row‐by‐row with “C,” “I,” or “NA.” You can put two “CCs” or two “IIs” if the information is particularly
compelling. The ratings will likely depend on some assumptions, and if so, then record those assumptions in another column, row‐by‐
row.
Step 4 Think about how the matrix may need revising. To do this, sort the information for diagnosticity (i.e., which items of information are
most helpful in comparing hypotheses). Consider how much confidence you have in the assumptions for the highly diagnostic
Inconsistent ratings, and readjust the ratings accordingly. Delete the rows with nondiagnostic information. Reconsider the hypotheses
and decide if any need combining or any if new ones need to be added. Finally, rate the information for the combined or new
hypotheses, again making note of any assumptions. You will need to redraw and update the matrix.
Step 5 Draw tentative conclusions about the relative likelihood of each hypothesis based on the diagnosticity of each item of information. Do
this by adding up the number of Inconsistent ratings for each hypothesis to give an “Inconsistency Score” for each hypothesis. Then,
rank the hypotheses so that the highest rank is given to the one with the lowest inconsistency score. The hypothesis with the lowest
inconsistency score is tentatively the most likely hypothesis and the hypothesis with the highest inconsistency score is usually the
least likely.
Step 6 Analyse the sensitivity of your tentative conclusion to a change in the interpretation of a few critical items of relevant information. If
one or more of these items were wrong, misleading or subject to a different interpretation will your conclusion need to change? If so,
then go back and double‐check the accuracy of your interpretation.
Step 7 Report your conclusions. Consider the relative likelihood of all of the hypotheses. State which items of information were the most
diagnostic, and how compelling a case they make in identifying the most likely hypothesis. Also say why alternative hypotheses were
rejected.
Step 8 Identify indicators or milestones for future observation. Create two lists—one focusing on future events or access to additional
information that would support your conclusion, and one list focusing on events and information that would suggest your conclusion
is less likely to be correct or that the situation has changed.
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